

The Problem of Evil: A New Solution

Atle Ottesen Søvik

Dean of Studies, MF, Norwegian School of Theology

Atle.O.Sovik@mf.no

I have recently presented a new solution to the problem of evil, by expanding on Keith Ward's ideas about the subject. In this article I present my solution to the problem of evil, but I add several new data and arguments concerning human independence, the indeterminism involved in God's creation, and animal pain.

Introduction

In this article I will present a solution to the problem of evil, also known as a theodicy. It has been presented before, but several new points will be added in this article. I shall notify the reader when these new elements are presented. First I present the problem as it will be defined in this article. Then I present how Keith Ward solves the problem, but at different places I add ideas of my own. Some of these I have published before, and some are new here. Objections are answered as I proceed. I conclude that the theodicy presented is a coherent Christian theodicy.

The problem of evil can be defined in many ways, but here I shall define it as the theoretical problem that there seems to be a contradiction between on the one hand believing in a good and omnipotent God, and on the other hand believing that there is genuine evil in the world. The term 'evil' is here used in a wide sense to include suffering caused by human and other causes. The reason why there seems to be a contradiction is that if God is good, he presumably wants there to be no evil, and if he is omnipotent, he presumably could cause it to be no evil, and so it seems to follow that there should be no evil, but there is. By saying that the evil is

'genuine', I mean that it does not serve a higher good which in a wider perspective would make the evil good. I shall return to what is meant by saying that God is good and omnipotent.

Many solutions to this problem deny that God is either good or omnipotent, or they deny that there is genuine evil. I accept that God is good and omnipotent, and that there is genuine evil in the world. The solution I present denies that there is a real contradiction, and shows why the contradiction is merely apparent by adding an extra claim. That extra claim is that God wanted to create an independent world. This is the starting point for Keith Ward's theodicy, which I shall now present.

God Wanted to Create an Independent World

There is a very difficult question that many theodicies are unable to answer, and it is this: Why did God create a world in the first place where suffering is possible? Ward's explanation is that God wanted to create an independent world with independent beings.¹ By that he means not only independent humans, but an independent world in general – a world where not everything is controlled by God, but rather a world which itself

brings forth new and creative values. God then becomes an artistic, creative God who not only creates things, but who creates things that create.²

Let me specify that by 'independence' I do not mean that we are not dependent on God for our existence. God keeps everything in being from moment to moment, so in that sense we are totally dependent on God. What is meant by 'independence' here, is that God has given both humans and the world room to develop themselves on their own.

Ward does not give many reasons to warrant that this was a goal for God's creation, except from what I have already mentioned: that independence and a creative creation is something which is valuable in itself, and which therefore a good God may well create. In my book on the problem of evil, I added some arguments from Wolfhart Pannenberg, to support the claim that God wanted to create an independent world. Pannenberg argues that humans must have some independence and distance from God in order to be able to live alongside the holy and eternal God.³ He also argues that if we are to become independent persons, in the sense of being centres of our own activity, we need space and time for ourselves to develop.⁴ Both Pannenberg and Richard Swinburne think that God wanting us to be independent explains why God's existence is not more obvious to us.⁵

Now, these arguments still do not show that God wanted us to be as independent as we actually are. I shall in this article add three arguments in favour of the claim that God wanted to create an independent world. The first argument is that this is a Christian understanding of creation. Before the fall, God says to the humans that they should subdue the earth and have dominion over it (Gen 1:28).

This seems to imply that God is handing over control over the earth to the humans, and may therefore well be interpreted as God giving over some of his own control and giving humans independence. When God creates by using formulas like "let the earth bring forth..." (Gen 1:11 and 24) it also suggests God creating a creative world, instead of God directly producing everything from nothing.

The second argument appeals to the point that the world and humans are in fact quite independent. If one believes in an omnipotent God, it follows that things will happen the way he wants it to. However, it does not follow with *necessity*, since there may be restrictions also on the power of an omnipotent being (more on that later), but at least things must follow the will of God *often*, since God cannot be omnipotent and never get his will done. Inductively we may therefore reason that if there is an omnipotent God, and the world is in fact quite independent, it is *likely* (but not *necessary*) that it is so because God wanted it to be so.

However, that God wants us to be independent seems to contradict an obvious part of Christian belief, namely that God wants relationship with us. As a solution to this problem, I suggest that God wants relationship with independent beings, and so he must give them some space to become independent, and then they can choose to have relationship with him, and the relationship with God after death will be the full realization of God's desire for relationship with us. This is like when we as parents want relationship with our children and want them to be safe, and at the same time we want them to become independent, and so we must give up some of our control over them to let that happen.

A third argument in favour of God

wanting us to be independent is the fact that such an hypothesis gives a good solution to the problem of evil, namely the solution I am presenting here. It thus gets support by producing a coherent theory of God. Step one is thus to argue that God wanted to create an independent world. Step two is to ask how such a world must be, and that is the next question I shall consider.

How Must an Independent World be?

Ward argues that an independent world must fulfil two conditions: It must be law-like and there must be indeterminism in it. The reason why it must be law-like is that there is no point for humans to have independence if the world is not to a large degree predictable. In order to use my independence I must be quite certain about what happens if I choose for example to grow potatoes under the right conditions. Then more potatoes will come up from the earth. If the world was chaotic and unpredictable and anything could happen if I put potatoes in the earth, there would be no point in acting since we would not know what our actions would lead to.

The second condition is that there must be indeterminism at the macro level of humans in the world.⁶ This is because we cannot have free will if the world is deterministic, according to Keith Ward. But when the world is undetermined, it will also lead to natural evils occurring, like diseases and natural disasters. That is the case because indeterminism implies causeless events, or at least that unpredicted things may happen without being determined to happen, and this then includes natural evils. By ‘natural evils’, I mean evils not caused by intended free human actions. Indeterminism is necessary for free will, but it has the bad side

effect of producing natural evils.

Philosophers known as compatibilists disagree that free will requires indeterminism, and think that free will is compatible with determinism. Compatibilists also argue that indeterminism makes free will impossible, since it seems to make free choices a matter of luck, and they are sceptical to idealists like Ward, who think that there are unique, non-physical human souls with free will.⁷ In my book, I argued that Keith Ward was not giving good arguments in favour of free will requiring indeterminism. I also argued that he did not show why there had to be indeterminism at the macro level of humans in the world in order for us to have free will. I briefly presented a theory of free will which could explain that, but this question is too big to discuss in this article.⁸

Indeterminism is meant as the explanation of natural evils, but there is an objection to this which I did not discuss in my book.⁹ It seems plausible that indeterminism might cause some mutations which create diseases caused by viruses and bacteria. But what about the fact that our earth is filled with magma that produces earth quakes and volcano eruptions? It seems unreasonable that all earth quakes and volcano eruptions are caused by indeterminism. If God did not intend natural disasters like that to be the case, it seems that he must have introduced indeterminism at a very early stage in creation. But if that is the case, it seems that God has very little control over creation, since indeterminism at the early stage of creation could have produced a universe very different from ours.

I shall now argue that God did introduce indeterminism at an early stage in creation. As a start, consider what we know about the creation of our universe.

First of all, the universe is enormously large. All the galaxies are made out of a billionth of the particles in the universe, and out of these 90% is hydrogen, the simplest atom.¹⁰ But there is one tiny region of this vast space, which is complex and has produced carbon-based life, namely our own planet. According to evolutionary theory, life arose there roughly three billion years ago, humans around 100 000 years ago, depending on how humans are defined. We know that in geological history, there have been at least five great disasters that have destroyed almost all life. At one time, 98 % of all life became extinct.¹¹

If God's goal was only to produce conscious human beings this seems like a strange way of creating. It involves a lot of unused space and time, and it seems strange to start over and over with producing the animals that finally evolved to become human beings. But if there was indeterminism at an early stage in creation, we can understand why it happened that way. However, the reader may think that this description of the universe seems to imply that there was no designing creator at all. But that is not the case. There are two different arguments that strongly suggest a consciously designing creator of the universe. The first is the fine-tuning of many constants in the universe, which fit better with a designer than with chance, because they are so wildly improbable.¹² God set initial constants independent of there being indeterminism in the world. The second argument has to do with the fact that our universe is a consciousness-producing universe. The fact that there exists consciousness is a mind-blowingly amazing fact about the universe, since there is nothing about the physical world which should indicate or make it likely that consciousness should arise.¹³ But of

course it fits extremely well with a conscious creator who created the world in order to have relationship with other conscious beings.

In conclusion, the universe clearly seems designed, while at the same time it clearly seems that indeterminism has played a role from an early time on. The other alternatives are either that there is no designer, but that does not fit with the existence of fine-tuning and consciousness; or that God wanted history to be exactly this way, but then it is hard to see any good reason why God wanted there to be so much empty space and so many great disasters before humans evolved.

Why Cannot God Intervene More often in an Independent World?

Thus far it has been shown that if God wanted to create an independent world it had to be lawlike and undetermined. The third step is to see why God in such a world performs special divine actions sometimes, but not at other times.¹⁴ This is also a difficult question that few theodicies have a good answer to: why does God do miracles or heal people sometimes, but not at other times? I presuppose that a Christian must believe in miracles, since a historical resurrection is a miracle and an indispensable belief in Christianity. So, why does God only perform special divine actions in the world sometimes?

Ward says that God cannot interrupt the regularities of the world too much if he wants an independent world. I interpret him as talking about the physical regularities of the world, but also the very fact that we are independent. If God acts in the world, it will have consequences far beyond what we can know, and disturb the independence of the world in ways we cannot know. This is because the world is

extremely interconnected, typically illustrated by the fact that a butterfly can create a storm in another part of the world since very small changes can have very big effects.

Since we do not know how God's acts influence the world, and since we do not know how independent God wants the world to be, it is impossible for us to predict when or how God will act in the world. But he will do so sometimes, and by praying for God to act, we change the world God acts in, so petitionary prayer is not meaningless in Ward's understanding of divine action. The only thing we can predict is that God will not do many special divine actions if he wants the world to be independent.

This may seem contradicted by the fact that God healed many people and did many miracles through Jesus. Since he could raise Jesus from the dead, why are not people raised from the dead all the time now? If God wants the world to be so independent that he does not intervene very often, why did he do so around the time of Jesus? My answer is that God has an especially good reason for making an exception to the general goal of independence, and that is to offer a revelation to those who seek it. Since the goal of our existence is relationship with God, it is good of God to show us a way if we want relationship with him. That makes it necessary for him to make a decisive revelation of himself. Since so many claim to offer a revelation from God, it would be good if God would put his own special signature on his decisive revelation so we could know it was from him. A signature from God would be something that only God could do, like a very special miracle, like raising someone from the dead after three days.¹⁵

The fact that God wants an indepen-

dent world explains why God does not intervene very often, and the fact that the world is very interconnected explains why God's healings and miracles seem arbitrary. It is difficult for many other theodicies to explain why God heals rarely and seemingly arbitrarily, but Ward offers an explanation. I know that this claim about how God intervenes is unfalsifiable, and that is a disadvantage about it. But at least it offers an explanation where many other theodicies do not. Something can be both true and unfalsifiable, although it is better argued as true when falsifiable. In this case, the claim gets support by being part of an otherwise coherent theory.

Why would God Create an Independent World when it Leads to Suffering?

Ward raises an obvious objection to this theodicy: Why would God create such an independent world where there is so much suffering? Would it not be much better to create a less independent world with less suffering? It seems to be a central Christian belief that God can, since Christians believe that God one day will make all things good. So why has he not done so already, or instead of making an independent world with much suffering?

Ward's answer has several parts. First of all, he argues that although God could have created other beings in a less independent world, he could not have created you and me – the token¹⁶ individuals of this world – in another world. It is impossible for you to complain that God should have created you in another world, for then he would not have created you, but somebody else. It is like wishing you had other parents: it is impossible, for if two other people than your parents had gotten a child, they would not have gotten you, but somebody else. That is because

we are not souls with bodies, but rather we are physical processes in this world receiving our identity from our relations in this world.¹⁷

But could not God have created you and me *ex nihilo* with all our relations right into heaven without a long history of suffering? No, since being independent means that we are partly self-created beings. If God wanted self-created beings, it is logically impossible to create self-created beings *ex nihilo* – it requires a history of independent choices.

But could not God have created us in a world where we could develop independence, but where suffering was impossible? Ward argues that there are some basic metaphysical structures and principles of reality which God has not created. They are part of God's being, since God embraces everything that exists within him, but they are not created by God. God cannot have chosen how every part of reality should be, since there must have been a God there in the first place to make the first choices. Some structures of reality are thus eternal and uncreated, and Ward hypothesizes that the metaphysical possibility of suffering is one of those. This is just a hypothesis without further support than the fact that it helps create a coherent theodicy. However, we know that suffering is possible, but we have no reason to claim that God could have created an independent world where suffering is impossible.

Ward specifies that by omnipotence he does not mean that God can do everything that is imaginable, but rather that God is as powerful as it is metaphysically possible to be. That is extremely powerful, since he created out of nothing, raised Jesus from the dead, and can make all things good. But there may be metaphysical limitations unknown to us. Omni-

potence is not just a matter of what is logically possible, but also metaphysically possible. We do not know what it is to create out of nothing, how it can be done, in what sense of 'nothing', or whether restrictions apply. We must therefore be very careful when we say what God could or could not have done.

Was it then morally wrong of God to create a world where so much suffering could happen? Did he take too big a risk in creating? Ward argues that God compensates by offering eternal happiness to everyone. He could not ask us before we were born if we wanted to be born, so he made the choice for us that it is likely that we wanted to be born when that was our only possibility to have eternal life in happiness with him. He did not ask us, but Ward thinks that an extremely great good clearly outweighs a much smaller evil, and that it is good for God to make that choice for us when we cannot. It is similar to what we as parents do when we choose to have children: we assume that they will have a good life, and take the risk of having children, even though it may be the case that they will have a life full of pain.

I repeat that God could not have chosen to create you and me in a world without suffering. His only possibility for offering a place in heaven for you and me, was to let us come into being here first, and then to let us have the choice of being with him forever. I presuppose here that all will get a real chance to be saved, since God is loving, just, and wants all to be saved. There is not much biblical support for this, although 1 Pet 4:6 may be used as support. However, it makes many other pieces fit together and so I presuppose here that all will have a real choice, so that damnation is self-chosen.

How does Animal Pain fit into a World of Independence?

What about animal pain? Humans may get compensation for their suffering, but what about animals? They suffer too, so how can that be made coherent with the goodness of God? I here add some reflections to what I have earlier written about the topic. Ward entertains the possibility that animals may not have a conscious experience of pain the way we do. That may sound strange, since many animals show the same kind of pain behaviour as we do. But maybe they show this behaviour since pain avoidance is good for survival even though they have no conscious experience of pain.

To understand this we can distinguish between three parts of a pain experience. The first part is the sensing of pain and the connected behaviour (screaming and avoiding the pain). The second part is a subject having a conscious experience of having pain, and the third part is to evaluate the pain as bad. One may think that part two and three are inseparable from part one, but they are not. The reason we can separate these parts is that we know about people who have some of the parts without having the others. We can do many things without being conscious of it, so conscious experience seems to be at a higher level of experience. We remove our hand from the hot plate before we are conscious of the pain. And you can have a conscious experience of pain without considering it as bad – for example some lobotomized people would be a case in point.¹⁸

It seems that parts two and three of the pain experience require a quite complex brain. It is only humans that we know can have a conscious experience of being a subject over time able to consider how things feel. Famous zoologists, neuro-

scientists and philosophers have argued that animals may not feel pain.¹⁹

Against this one may object that pain only works if it feels bad, since that is what motivates animal to withdraw from pain. But alternatively one may argue that evolution has favoured animals withdrawing from pain, and that does not require them to feel it consciously.²⁰ They may seem to hurt since they act like us when we hurt. But also cells and amoebas can withdraw from sharp objects and shrink where poked, so that they seem to hurt even if there is no reason to think they do.²¹ When animals twist their face like us in pain, we know that we are in pain in such circumstances, and infer that they are as well, but that need not be the case. There are good reasons to think that consciousness requires very complex brain activity. We know which parts of the brain are associated with consciousness and not, since people have had their brains scanned while reporting what they are conscious of. What is common to the consciousness-producing areas of the brain is an extreme interconnectedness of neurons organized around a gate of information input.²² It seems that something physical is the cause of consciousness since there is activity in the brain first, and then the conscious experience follows afterwards.²³

On the other hand, it may be that animals consciously feel pain anyway. From an ethical perspective, we must act as if they feel pain, since it may be the case that they do. But when we discuss what is true, we have seen that it is far from clear that animals actually feel pain consciously. If they do have a conscious experience of being a subject, God might of course continue their life after death in a similar way as he does with humans, for example humans who died without ever having

had a normal conscious life. Ward does find that possible as well, and God knows which animals that would be.

Would not an Independent World be Better?

Let us then say that it is true that God could not have created independent beings without the possibility of suffering, and that the evil they suffer will be compensated if they accept the offer of salvation. Still, one may ask why God did not choose a low-risk world with little independence instead of a high-risk world with much independence. Even if he could not create us in that low-risk world, he could have created someone else there. So why did he not create somebody else instead of us, to avoid all the suffering?

Ward does not answer that objection, but in my book I suggested how Ward could have answered it. He does mention in one place the possibility that God may have created all possible worlds where good outweighs evil, but he does not argue that he actually believes that to be the case. And it does seem problematic, because eternal bliss in heaven will outweigh all evils, but that must then mean that God must have created extremely many worlds that are all as close to hell as you can get. I suggest a simpler answer, namely that God has created both an independent high-risk world (which is our universe) and a less independent no-risk world (which is heaven).

In heaven there may be angels and unborn babies and who knows what else. I guess that unborn babies and persons with a severely defective mental life are created into persons with a conscious life like other participants in heaven. If God had to create either just a high-risk independent world or a no-risk less independent world, he should have created just

the no-risk world. But if he could create both worlds, that would be a good thing to do. Why? First of all, since it is good for us, since that is our only possibility for participating in that other world.

Secondly, because it is good for God to be able to have another kind of relationship with another kind of being than those who are created directly into heaven. Such a world can actualize other kinds of good values than in a less independent world. By creating both worlds, God does something good. There is no such thing as the best world, since a world can always be better. But a good God will do good things, and creating our world was a good thing. If God has created both our world and heaven, there is no contradiction between believing on the one hand in a good and omnipotent God, and on the other hand believing that there is evil and suffering in the world.²⁴

Conclusion

There are numerous objections that still could have been raised. But this article has now reached a full article's length, so it is time to conclude. The theodicy I have suggested is to argue that God wanted an independent world. That requires law-likeness and indeterminism, which again explain both moral and natural evils. God cannot intervene often because of the independence of the world and we cannot predict when he can intervene since the world is so interconnected and since we do not know the level of independence God wants. It is good that God created this independent world since it is our only possibility of being in God with heaven. Although God could have created just heaven, it is good that he created us in addition, since that gives us the opportunity to be with God forever, and since our world actualizes other values

than what heaven alone would do. Many objections could still have been raised, and I answer a large number of objections

in my book, so I refer the reader to that. Other objections will be answered in future articles.

Noter

1. This presentation of Ward's theodicy is based on Atle Ottesen Søvik, *The Problem of Evil and the Power of God, Studies in Systematic Theology* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), chapters three and ten, where all references to Ward's work can be found.
2. Michael Murray argues that it is better of God not to make a machine, but rather a machine-making machine (Michael J. Murray, *Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 180-192).
3. Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematische Theologie, vol. 3* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 690, ET: 642. 'ET' refer to the English translations of Pannenberg's Systematic Theology: Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic theology, vol. 1* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991); Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic theology, vol. 2* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994); Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic theology, vol. 3* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998).
4. Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematische Theologie, vol. 2* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 117, ET: 195-196.
5. Richard Swinburne, *Providence and the Problem of Evil* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 206-207; and Pannenberg, *Systematische Theologie 2*, 200, ET: 173.
6. By determinism I mean the belief that only one future is possible because of previous causes, while indeterminism rejects this view and holds that several futures are possible. By saying that only one future is possible, I mean that it is already determined what the content of the future shall be.
7. Keith Ward, *Defending the Soul* (Chatham, NY: Oneworld, 1992), 55-56, 125. Ward is an idealist in the sense that he thinks that consciousness is a more fundamental part of reality than the physical (see Ward: Keith Ward, *More than Matter? What Humans Really Are* (Oxford: Lion Hudson, 2010)). For an overview of positions and arguments in the free will debate, see the introduction chapter of Robert Kane, *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
8. Søvik, *The Problem of Evil and the Power of God*, 254-255. I have written a book about free will showing why macro level indeterminism is necessary for free will: Atle Ottesen Søvik, *Naturalism and Free Will* (forthcoming, 2013). 'Macro level indeterminism' means that micro level indeterminism such as quantum indeterminism is not enough, if this cancels out at the macro level of human action, but again I do not have space to show why that is important.
9. Thanks to the Fil1010-class at MF Norwegian School of Theology, Autumn 2011 for this objection.
10. Victor J. Stenger, *Timeless Reality: Symmetry, Simplicity, and Multiple Universes* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2000), 277.
11. Bill Bryson, *A Short History of Nearly Everything* (London: Black Swan, 2004), 416-417.
12. See the webpage of Robin Collins for an overview of this argument: <http://home.messiah.edu/~rcollins/> (2012-11-27)
13. For arguments against a physical explanation of consciousness, see Galen Strawson, "Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism", *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 13, no. 10-11 (2006). In this article I use the term 'consciousness' for 'phenomenal consciousness'. Phenomenal consciousness is the qualitative experience of what something is like, as opposed to being conscious in the sense of just being awake and not asleep or in coma (Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", *The Philosophical Review* 83, no. 4 (1974): 436). Such consciousness requires a subject, since it cannot be *like* something unless it like something *for* someone. However, it need not be advanced self-consciousness in the sense of a cognitive self-understanding.
14. Special divine actions are acts of God with a local effect in space and time not caused by natural causes, as opposed to general divine actions like God keeping the world in being (Nicholas Saunders, *Divine Action and Modern Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 21).
15. Richard Swinburne, *Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 112.
16. A *token* is a particular instance of something, as opposed to the *type*. If you write the same word three times, there are three tokens, but one type.
17. For a long defence of the claim that entities receive their identity from their relations, see Lorenz B. Puntel, *Struktur und Sein: Ein Theorierahmen für systematische Philosophie* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006).
18. Murray, *Nature Red in Tooth and Claw*, 48-57.
19. Murray mentions primatologist Gordon Gallup jr, who in *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews* writes that there is no reason to believe that there is mental life in animals apart from humans and the most advanced apes. Murray also mentions Bob Bermond, who argues that animals do not feel pain in "The Myth of

Animal Suffering” *ibid.*, 61-62. Also neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and philosopher Peter Carruthers are open to the possibility that animals do not feel pain (Antonio R. Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999), 73 and Peter Carruthers, *Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), chapters 10 and 11).

20. Murray, *Nature Red in Tooth and Claw*, 57.

21. *Ibid.*, 62.

22. Antonio R. Damasio, *Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010), 86-87.

23. *Ibid.*, 122. This is a huge topic, and for a proper defence of these last claims I must refer the reader elsewhere: Søvik, *Naturalism and Free Will* (forthcoming, 2013).

24. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the following objection: it seems that I only speak about one possible world which includes heaven, and not two different possible worlds. My answer is that the different worlds I am talking about are one which includes heaven only and one which includes life on earth before life in heaven. When there is life on earth before life in heaven, there will be different participants in heaven than if only heaven existed, and for that reason there are two different worlds I am discussing.